In Calin Georgescu, a Nigel Farage-shaped warning to Britain’s major parties
As the world reckons with Donald Trump’s return to the White House and a changing political landscape, Calin Georgescu became the latest anti-NATO nationalist to emerge as a leading politician in Eastern Europe. His victory in the first round of the Romanian presidential elections was one based on social media success, a rubbishing of ‘mainstream media’, and a rejection of traditional parties. Those mirror Nigel Farage’s playbook for Reform UK, and Britain’s major parties must now wake up to the threat that he could pose at the next election.
Georgescu’s rise is a remarkable one that culminated last week when he secured a leading 23% of the vote ahead of the USR candidate, Elena Lasconi. It marks the first time in the history of Romanian politics that neither of the major parties, the PNL and the PSD, have made it into the final round of a presidential election. That further vote is scheduled for 8th December but may now be delayed due to a recount that was requested by the PSD, who find themselves fewer than 4000 votes away from a place in the run-off.
Extraordinarily, Georgescu recorded zero electoral expenses throughout his campaign, instead claiming that his success was a result of organic growth on TikTok and other social media platforms. The Permanent Electoral Authority (AEP) has reported those claims to prosecutors but Georgescu’s popularity on social media is undeniable. It is here that the first comparisons to Nigel Farage and Reform UK can be found. A Guardianinvestigation found that his posts and following in the lead-up to the general election dwarfed those of all other parties. Every post from Farage’s personal account outperformed the next best in Labour by 30%.
The similarities between the two men don’t stop there. In the face of high inflation and rising costs of living in one of Europe’s poorest economies, Georgescu was keen to focus his campaign on the systemic failure of traditional parties and politics to deliver. For years, Farage has sought to use similar rhetoric and he succeeded in doing so in the Brexit referendum of 2016.
The so-called ‘mainstream media’ are another place where Georgescu and Farage see eye to eye. Both have come to dominate online spheres in their respective countries and manage to create echo chambers where party support and conspiracy theories are rampant. A preference for isolationism and a rejection of NATO draw the two together as well — something particularly concerning for Romanians who find themselves on the Ukrainian border.
What should concern British politics most, however, is that there is a significant vacuum that Farage and Reform could move into ahead of the next general election. Youth turnout in UK general elections has been comparatively low for several cycles when compared to similar nations, where 54% of all adults voted this year. In the last election, it sat at a staggeringly low 37% in that age group compared with 73% in the Netherlands and 72% in Germany. This is the most simple explanation as to why only 8% of Britains in that age group voted for Reform in 2024 despite polling showing relatively high support.
Alarm bells must ring here for Britain’s political establishment. It is far from inconceivable that over the course of a five-year election cycle Farage could drive voter registration and turnout amongst that age group, especially young men. A failure to substantially raise living standards and present a clear strategy on immigration could prove catastrophic to the status quo that has remained for so long in British politics.
